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FOUR PATHWAYS OF UNDERMINING BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA V. GARRETT
Derek Warden
ABSTRACT
In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, the Supreme Court held that Title I of the ADA did not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity; and as such, a plaintiff could not obtain damages against
the states or sue the states directly for injunctive relief. Many courts and
scholars have read Garrett as sounding the death knell for ADA Title I government employee plaintiffs. This article shows that such fears are misplaced. Indeed, this article offers four pathways around Garrett that show
Title I and its requirements are very much alive and well. First, the article
shows that traditional civil rights doctrines allow government employees to
sue their employers either for damages or injunctive relief regardless of
Garrett’s perceived holding. Second, the article shows how subsequent case
law developed under Title II of the ADA allows Title I plaintiffs to sue the
states for damages where the state conduct violates both Title I and the
Constitution. Third, the article explores the ramifications of using Title II of
the ADA as employment discrimination legislation instead of Title I and
shows that the abrogation outcome is different. Finally, in the fourth pathway of this article, it is shown that because disability discrimination violates
valid national policy legislation (passed under the Commerce Clause) any
government interest manifested in such a way as to violate that policy-based
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law is illegitimate for purposes of equal protection rational basis scrutiny.
As such, the fourth pathway argues all violations of the ADA amount to violations of the Fourteenth Amendment; and due to the analysis of the second
pathway, Garrett should be totally overruled.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................... 557
A. General Background ...................................................... 557
B. The Americans with Disabilities Act in General ........... 559
C. Board of Trustees of the University of
Alabama v. Garrett ....................................................... 561
II. THE FIRST PATHWAY ............................................................... 563
A. State Employees and Ex parte Young ............................. 563
B. Title I of the ADA and Local Governments ................... 565
C. The Rehabilitation Act ................................................... 565
III. THE SECOND PATHWAY: USING THE GEORGIA-LANE ANALYSIS
FOR SITUATIONS WHERE STATES VIOLATE BOTH TITLE I AND
THE CONSTITUTION ............................................................... 566
A. Lane and Georgia Generally .......................................... 566
B. The Impact of Georgia ................................................... 569
IV. THE THIRD PATHWAY: TITLE II AS EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW .......................................................... 571
A. The Circuit Split ............................................................. 572
B. Title II as Valid Abrogation in the Employment Context
Where Conduct does not also Violate the Constitution... 574
1. Right or Rights at Issue ............................................. 574
2. A History of Unconstitutional Conduct..................... 575
3. Congruence and Proportionality .............................. 577
a. Consonance based congruence and
proportionality .................................................... 578
b. Garrett’s narrow approach to congruence and
proportionality .................................................... 581
V. THE FOURTH PATHWAY: DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION MADE
ILLEGITIMATE FOR EQUAL PROTECTION PURPOSES BY THE
ADA AS COMMERCE CLAUSE LEGISLATION ........................ 583
VI. CONCLUSION .......................................................................... 585

2020]

UNDERMINING GARRETT

557

I. INTRODUCTION
A.

General Background

During most of world history, even into the modern era, persons with
disabilities have been largely ostracized, mistreated, and regarded as having
little to no value to society. These sentiments led to vast and widespread
social ills which affected persons with disabilities in ways often times difficult for individuals today to fathom.1 Some of the ways persons with disabilities were treated have been said to resemble horror movies rather than real
life, while other forms of social ills directed toward them were more benign.2 Examples of the more benign social ills were inaccessible buildings,
roads, homes, and programs. More malicious forms of discrimination included unjustified institutionalization, intentional and accidental exacerbation of disabilities, forced sterilization, standing torture, scalding baths, and
outright denial of services based on stereotypes.3
Thankfully, the world began to turn. Documentaries exposing ill treatment of people with disabilities brought the public’s attention to the awful
scenes of massive mental health institutions such as Bridgewater,4 Willowbrook,5 and Pennhurst.6 Parents and family members began to think of ways
to care for those with disabilities. Social movements arose, which targeted
the inaccessibility of bus routes and public buildings. Federal and state laws
opened the courthouse doors to those with disabilities to sue for discriminatory practices. States that accepted federal funds were forced to establish
protection and advocacy systems7 that now resemble parens patriea.8 These
protection and advocacy systems are meant to prevent and address the
aforementioned widespread social ills.9

1. Derek Warden, A Worsened Discrimination: How the Exacerbation of Disabilities
Constitutes Discrimination by Reason of Disability Under Title II of the ADA and § 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act, 46 S. U. L. REV. 14, 21–22 (2018).
2. Id. at 22.
3. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-65) (listing several such
examples).
4. See Warden, supra note 1, at 22.
5. See id. at 27.
6. See id. at 24.
7. Melissa Bowman, Open Debate Over Closed Doors: The Effect of the New Developmental Disabilities Regulations on Protection and Advocacy Programs, 85 KY. L. J. 955,
956–57 (1997).
8. See Fernando J. Gutierrez, Who Is Watching Big Brother When Big Brother Is
Watching Mental Health Professionals: A Call For the Evaluation of Mental Health Advocacy Programs, 20 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 57, 63 (1996).
9. Gary P. Gross, Protection and Advocacy System Standing – To Vindicate the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities, 22 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 674, 674 (1998).
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Two of the laws enacted during the height of the disability rights
movement stand as paramount: the Rehabilitation Act10 and the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”).11 The latter covers the education
of persons with disabilities12 and the former covers numerous other types of
discrimination by entities that receive federal funds.13 These laws, though
effective and useful, did not produce total social integration or eliminate
mistreatment of persons with disabilities.14 State laws meant to supplement
the Rehabilitation Act and the IDEA were held not enforceable by the federal courts.15 Indeed, federal courts took little time to narrow the scope of both
the IDEA and the Rehabilitation Act.16 It became clear that additional protections for persons with disabilities were necessary.17
That something more would be a law that protected people with disabilities from all entities and not just those that received federal funds.18 The
law would need to cover roads, sidewalks, commercial buildings, hotels,
court houses, prisons, and schools as well as practices, procedures, actions,
inactions, and policies based on stereotypes.19 It would need to cover not
only those things that were directly discriminatory but also those things that
led to discrimination.20 It would need to address situations where disabilities
were a cause of discrimination not the sole cause.21 It would need to abro10. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 701–799 (Westlaw through Pub. L. 116-91).
11. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400–1482 (Westlaw through Pub. L. 116-91).
12. Durbrow v. Cobb Cty. Sch. Dist., 887 F.3d 1182, 1189 (11th Cir. 2018) (“The IDEA
represents an ambitious national undertaking to promote the education of children with disabilities.”).
13. 1 AMERICANS WITH DISAB.: PRACT. & COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 1:1 (Westlaw 2019).
14. See Spieth v. Bucks Cty. Hous. Auth., 594 F. Supp. 2d 584, 590 (E.D. Penn. 2009)
(“Because the RA applies only to federally funded programs and activities, Congress enacted
Title II of the ADA to extend these prohibitions to all state and local government programs
and activities.”).
15. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984) (holding that
plaintiffs may not use Ex parte Young to force state actors to comply with state law).
16. See Pinkerton v. Spellings, 529 F.3d 513, 516 (5th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that
courts apply a higher causation standard for § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act than they do for
the ADA); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989) (holding that original IDEA did not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity), superseded by statute, 20 U.S.C. § 1403, as recognized in Pace v. Bogalusa City Sch. Bd., 403 F.3d 272 (5th Cir. 2005).
17. Armen H. Merjian, Bad Decisions Make Bad Decisions: Davis, Arline, and Improper Application of the Undue Financial Burden Defense Under the Rehabilitation Act and the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 105, 141 (1991).
18. Miranda Oshige McGowan, Reconsidering the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35
GA. L. REV. 27, 59–60 (2000) (noting that the application of the Act was “quite limited”).
19. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101(a)(1)–(3), (5) (Westlaw through Pub. L. 116-65) (noting these
and similar forms of discrimination continued even in 1990 well after the passage of the
Rehabilitation Act).
20. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(5) (Westlaw through Pub. L. 116-65).
21. See Pinkerton v. Spellings, 529 F.3d 513, 516–19 (5th Cir. 2008) (causation standards for the ADA and § 504 are different).
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gate sovereign immunity and be free from the defense of qualified immunity.22
The need to protect persons with disabilities would soon be met, but
not without a fight. The need was met when the Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”) was passed.23 The fight took place on national news and became known as the “Capitol Crawl.”24 On the eve of the passage of the
ADA, it appeared as though the law would fail.25 Hope seemed to hang by a
thread. Supporters of the law were required to resort to self-advocacy. During the “Capitol Crawl,” individuals climbed out of their wheelchairs and
literally crawled up the steps to the Capitol Building in Washington D.C.26
Their efforts won out, and the ADA was passed in 1990 by sweeping
margins in both houses of Congress.27 President George H.W. Bush signed
the act into law, declaring, “Let the shameful wall of exclusion finally come
tumbling down.”28
B.

The Americans with Disabilities Act in General

That paradigm shifting statute, the Americans with Disabilities Act, is
divided into five titles. Title I governs employment.29 Title II covers public
entities.30 Title III governs places of public accommodation and services of
private entities.31 Title IV governs telecommunications.32 Title V concerns
various other miscellaneous matters.33 For purposes of this article, Titles I,
II, and V are the most significant.

22. Derek Warden, A Helping Hand: Examining the Relationship Between (1) Title II of
the ADA’s Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity Cases and (2) the Doctrine of Qualified Immunity in §1983 and Bivens Cases to Expand and Strengthen Sources of “Clearly Established Law” in Civil Rights Actions, 29 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 43, 45 (2018) (noting
that qualified immunity does not apply to the ADA and that Title II is often valid abrogation
of sovereign immunity).
23. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101–12213 (Westlaw through Pub. L. 116-65).
24. Faye Ginsburg & Rayna Rapp, Making Accessible Futures: From the Capitol Crawl
to #Cripthevote, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 699, 703 (2017).
25. A Magna Carta and the Ides of March to the ADA, MINN. GOVERNOR’S COUNCIL ON
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES (Mar. 1, 2015), http://mn.gov/mnddc/ada-legacy/ada-legacymoment27.html.
26. Ginsburg & Rapp, supra note 24, at 703.
27. See Brian East, Struggling to Fulfill Its Promise – The ADA at 15, 68 TEX. B.J. 614,
614–15 (2005).
28. Id. at 614.
29. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12111–12117 (Westlaw through Pub. L. 116-91).
30. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12131–12165 (Westlaw through Pub. L. 116-91).
31. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12181–12189 (Westlaw through Pub. L. 116-91).
32. 47 U.S.C.A. § 225 (Westlaw through Pub. L. 116-91).
33. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12201–12213 (Westlaw through Pub. L. 116-91).
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Title I prohibits employers from discriminating against individuals on
the basis of disability.34 It provides several theories under which plaintiffs
may sue. First is disparate treatment, where a person is treated differently
because of his or her disability.35 Second is disparate impact, wherein a facially neutral policy has an overwhelming discriminatory effect on otherwise qualified persons with one or more disabilities.36 Finally, qualified persons may recover from an employer that fails to make reasonable accommodations for those persons.37
Title II, on the other hand, states: “Subject to the provisions of this
subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”38 This operative language has caused some
confusion among the lower courts, which will be discussed later. Like Title
I, Title II provides several theories of discrimination—disparate treatment,
disparate impact, and failure to make reasonable accommodation.39
In addition to these general theories of discrimination, Title I has numerous regulations that govern discriminatory actions and place certain affirmative obligations on employers.40 Title II likewise contains numerous
regulations with sweeping implications.41 These regulations are often given
controlling weight as Congress directed the attorney general to issue these
regulations.42
Title V extends the protections of the ADA to Congress,43 excludes certain conditions,44 prohibits claims of “reverse discrimination,”45 allows recovery of attorney’s fees,46 and purports to abrogate state Eleventh Amendment immunity for an action brought under the ADA.47

34. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. 116-91).
35. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52–53 (2003).
36. Id.
37. EEOC v. LHC Group, Inc., 773 F.3d 688, 703 n.6 (5th Cir. 2014).
38. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12132 (Westlaw through Pub. L. 116-63).
39. Hernandez v. Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 124 F. Supp. 3d 1181, 1185
(D.N.M. 2015).
40. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.1–1630.16 (2019).
41. 28 C.F.R. § 35.101–35.999 (2019).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 12134 (Westlaw through Pub. L. 116-63); Todd v. Carstarphen, 236 F.
Supp. 3d 1311, 1326 (N.D. Ga. 2017) (collecting sources).
43. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12209 (Westlaw through Pub. L. 116-91).
44. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12211 (Westlaw through Pub. L. 116-91).
45. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12201 (Westlaw through Pub. L. 116-91).
46. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12205 (Westlaw through Pub. L. 116-91).
47. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12202 (Westlaw through Pub. L. 116-91).
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Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett

Patricia Garrett was a nurse who worked for the University of Alabama.48 When she was diagnosed with cancer, she asked for an accommodation; instead, she was demoted.49 Following her demotion, she sued the university for damages.50 The question before the Court was whether Title I of
the ADA—which deals exclusively with employment—validly abrogated
state sovereign immunity.51
Prior to any discussion on the Court’s analysis, it is important to mention a few legal principles. Plaintiffs may not sue the states or arms of the
states, such as universities, without the consent of the state or a proper abrogation of sovereign immunity.52 States did not waive their sovereign immunity under the ADA.53 As such, the only method by which Garrett could recover damages against the state under the ADA is if the ADA validly abrogated sovereign immunity. Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity
(1) when it declares its intent to abrogate sovereign immunity and (2) where
the underlying law is a valid exercise of a constitutional power.54 At one
point, it was thought that this second prong could be established using Congress’ commerce power.55 However, that theory was disfavored in Seminole
Tribe.56 Effectively, now the only provisions that validly abrogate sovereign
immunity are the enforcement provisions of the Reconstruction amendments.57 Most notable of these is the Fourteenth Amendment.58 The only
difference between valid enforcement legislation and abrogation legislation
is that the former does not require a congressional showing of intent to abrogate.59 Nevertheless, enforcement legislation is controlled by the City of
Boerne test, which requires that the means Congress adopted to enforce a
constitutional right be congruent and proportional to the right that Congress
sought to protect.60 The test resulting from City of Boerne also requires a
48. Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 362 (2001).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 360.
52. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000).
53. Gary v. Ga. Dept. of Human Res., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1372 (M.D. Ga. 2004).
54. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996).
55. Id. at 59.
56. Id. at 72.
57. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455–56 (1976).
58. David Krinsky, A Plan Revised: How the Congressional Power to Abrogate State
Sovereign Immunity Has Expanded Since the Eleventh Amendment, 93 GEO. L. J. 2067,
2070–72 (2005) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment has “swallowed the Eleventh
Amendment”).
59. Warden, supra note 22, at 56–57.
60. Id. at 56 n.69.
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showing of historical discrimination—or at least a congressionally identified
history of unconstitutional actions.61
Such was the state of the law when Garrett came before the Court. The
Court held that discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment was subject only to rational basis scrutiny, and that the state’s conduct
in Garrett satisfied this test because discrimination against employees with
disabilities was a rational way to save scarce resources.62 The Court then
went on to discuss how Congress had not identified a widespread history of
discrimination against persons with disabilities in public employment.63 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it ruled that the ADA’s requirements
that employers not discriminate against persons with disabilities and make
reasonable accommodation of those with disabilities far exceeded the
bounds of what the rational basis test required of government employers,
such that the ADA amounted not to enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment, but an attempt to rewrite the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.64 As such, Title I of the ADA was not a congruent and proportional
response to a documented history of widespread discrimination against persons with disabilities in public employment.65 And because Title I lacked
congruence and proportionality, it was not valid Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement legislation; thus, even though the ADA clearly expressed an
intent to abrogate sovereign immunity, Title I of the ADA did not validly
abrogate state sovereign immunity.66
While the Court’s reasoning may seem sound, I believe that Garrett belongs in its own anti-canon;67 an article arguing as much is planned for a
later date. Nevertheless, many courts and scholars believe that Garrett
sounded the death knell for Title I of the ADA for government employees.68
Indeed, even those courts and scholars that have taken a standard doctrinal
route to avoid Garrett have fallen to the error of believing there are no ar61. Id. at 56–57.
62. Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366–68, 372 (2001).
63. Id. at 368 (“The legislative record of the ADA, however, simply fails to show that
Congress did in fact identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment against
the disabled.”).
64. Id. at 372.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 374.
67. Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 380 (2011) (discussing the
traditional “anticanon”).
68. See Pace v. Bogalusa City Sch. Bd., 403 F.3d 273, 282–83 (5th Cir. 2005) (“The
Garrett Court concluded that Title I of the ADA was outside the scope of valid § 5 legislation; therefore, Congress’s attempt at abrogation failed, and private suits against states in
federal court were barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”); 2 AMERICANS WITH DISAB.: PRACT.
& COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 7:8 (Westlaw 2019) (“Title I of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) has been declared unconstitutional to the extent that it subjects nonconsenting
states to private suits for damages.”).
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guments that Title I of the ADA validly abrogates sovereign immunity in the
employment context.69
While in Garrett the Court certainly weakened Title I of the ADA,
Garrett should not be interpreted as defeating it. This article explores four
path ways around Garrett, each more theoretical than the last. Part II will
discuss how standard civil rights doctrine allows litigants to bypass the vast
majority of Garrett’s ill effects. Part III will discuss what I style “the Georgia-Lane analysis” and will show how this analysis allows abrogation under
Title I in those situations where government conduct actually violates the
Constitution. Part IV will explore using Title II of the ADA to prohibit public employers from discriminating on the basis of disability and will show
the impact such a view would have on abrogation of sovereign immunity.
Finally, Part V will discuss the Garrett decision’s own internally flawed
reasoning and show how the Court’s reasoning in Garrett necessarily means
that disability discrimination is never rationally related to a legitimate government interest.
II. THE FIRST PATHWAY
This part examines traditional civil rights doctrines and shows that Title I of the ADA is still very much alive for state employees who seek injunctive relief. In addition, it shows why local government employees may
use Title I to obtain damages. Finally, it explains that insofar as either local
or state employees work for agencies that receive federal funds, such plaintiffs may sue their employers for damages under a sister statute to Title I, the
Rehabilitation Act. While no court would seriously quarrel with the propositions made herein, this part is provided for completeness and in the hope
that courts and litigants may find it useful in the future.
A.

State Employees and Ex parte Young

As noted above, the Eleventh Amendment (sovereign immunity) protects states and arms of the state from being sued for either injunctive relief
or damages.70 There are exceptions to this immunity, of course. One such
exception is the legal fiction of Ex parte Young.71 That case now stands for
two propositions. First, there is an implied cause of action to sue for injunc-

69. See Collazo-Rosado v. Univ. of P.R., 775 F. Supp. 2d 376, 387–89 (D.P.R. 2011);
Gregory v. Admin. Office of the Courts of N.J., 168 F. Supp. 2d 319, 327 (D.N.J. 2001);
Smith v. State Univ. of N.Y., No. 1-CV1454, 2003 WL 1937208 at *4–5 (N.D.N.Y. April 23,
2003).
70. MSA Realty Corp. v. Illinois, 990 F.2d 288, 291 (7th Cir. 1993).
71. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 154 (1908).
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tive relief directly under the constitution.72 Second, plaintiffs may sue state
actors in their “official capacities” for equitable relief without offending the
Eleventh Amendment.73 Such injunctions may extend to reinstatement of
employment.74 However, plaintiffs may not sue such state actors in their
official capacities for damages,75 nor may plaintiffs use the doctrine to enforce state law.76
Nevertheless, in order to use Ex parte Young to enforce a statute, that
statute must be validly enacted.77 Therefore, if Title I is a valid enactment,
plaintiffs may use Ex parte Young to enforce it regardless of whether or not
Title I validly abrogates sovereign immunity.78 In Garrett, the Court held
that Title I did not validly abrogate sovereign immunity because Title I was
not valid Fourteenth Amendment enforcement legislation. As such, a plaintiff must find another source of legislative power upon which Title I may
stand. That source of power is the Commerce Clause. The ADA specifically
states that it was enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause.79 Therefore, if
the ADA is valid Commerce Clause legislation, plaintiffs may enforce it
under Ex parte Young. Due to the inherent commercial nature of employment and the sweeping impact disability discrimination had on the national
economy, courts should have and have had absolutely no problem in finding
that Title I of the ADA is valid Commerce Clause legislation.80 Thus, it is
possible to enforce Title I under Ex parte Young. Indeed, the Supreme Court
itself squarely recognized the amenability of Title I to Ex parte Young actions.81
Therefore, while Garrett appears to foreclose damages actions against
the states, plaintiffs may resort to using Ex parte Young to enforce the provisions of Title I of the ADA. Such enforcement no doubt extends to declaratory relief, as to the illegality of state policies, and to reinstatement, or any
other manner of injunctive relief.
72. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., PAMELA S. KARLAN, PETER W. LOW & GEORGE A.
RUTHERGLEN, CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: ENFORCING THE CONSTITUTION 495 (Foundation Press
4th ed. 2018).
73. Id.
74. Nelson v. Univ. of Tex. at Dall., 535 F. 3d 318, 322 (5th Cir. 2008).
75. Perez v. Wade, 652 F. Supp. 2d 901, 904 (W.D. Tenn. 2009) (collecting sources).
76. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984). The Halderman decision has become known as the Pennhurst Doctrine. It involves a disability rights
case. The author of this article plans to write a separate article criticizing the case as belonging in a disability rights anti-canon.
77. This is simply a matter of logic. If the federal statute is unconstitutional, it is unenforceable.
78. Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 n.9 (2001).
79. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(b)(4) (Westlaw through Pub. L. 116091).
80. Mitchell v. Miller, 884 F. Supp. 2d 334, 366 n.15 (W.D. Penn. 2012) (collecting
sources).
81. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n. 9.
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Title I of the ADA and Local Governments

Recall that in Garrett a state employee alleged employment discrimination perpetrated by her employer, the State.82 According to the Court in Garrett, Title I did not validly abrogate sovereign immunity because it was not
valid Fourteenth Amendment legislation.83 Title I, however, is valid Commerce Clause legislation.84 While Congress may not abrogate sovereign immunity by resorting to the Commerce Clause, Congress may subject local
entities and officials to damage awards by resorting to that same clause because states are protected by sovereign immunity while local entities are
not.85
C.

The Rehabilitation Act

Garrett was decided on the basis of sovereign immunity. Aside from
Ex parte Young and abrogation, one additional exception to sovereign immunity is waiver.86 States may waive their immunity in any way they wish. 87
One typical way for waiver to occur is by receipt of federal funds. In order
for a state to receive those federal funds, the state typically agrees to waive
their Eleventh Amendment immunity.88 One statute that requires such a
waiver is the Rehabilitation Act.89 The waiver extends only to the particular
state agency that accepts federal funds.90 The Rehabilitation Act incorporates the standards of the ADA.91 Thus, if a state entity accepted federal
funds and committed some form of disability discrimination, the offended
employee would be able to sue for damages or any other available relief
without offending the Eleventh Amendment.
Therefore, the first pathway undermines the Garrett decision in a number of ways. First, Garrett has virtually no effect on the ability of employees
to seek injunctive relief against state actors, which operates in much the
same way as if the State itself were sued. Second, Garrett has no impact on
82. See discussion supra Part I.C.
83. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374.
84. Mitchell, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 366 n.15.
85. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368–69.
86. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
675 (1999).
87. Id.
88. Koslow v. Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161, 171 (3d Cir. 2002).
89. Id. at 170.
90. Id. at 171.
91. Washington v. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 181 F.3d 840, 845 n.6 (7th Cir.1999)
(“Title II of the ADA was modeled after § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act; the elements of
claims under the two provisions are nearly identical, and precedent under one statute typically
applies to the other.”).
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the ability of local employees to sue local entities. Finally, insofar as a state
agency accepts federal funds, that particular state agency has waived its
Eleventh Amendment immunity.
However, the first pathway, around Garrett, alone is insufficient to
cover all employees as many people with disabilities are employed by states
and state agencies and many state agencies do not accept federal funds.
Moreover, injunctive relief is not always the most apt or desirable option for
these employees, especially if they were forced out of their employment due
to disability related harassment. As such, the following three parts consider
further options for avoiding the negative impacts of Garrett.
III. THE SECOND PATHWAY: USING THE GEORGIA-LANE ANALYSIS FOR
SITUATIONS WHERE STATES VIOLATE BOTH TITLE I AND THE
CONSTITUTION
This part considers the implications of post-Garrett abrogation of sovereign immunity cases under Title II of the ADA. Title II of the ADA prohibits public entities from discriminating on the basis of disability. The circuits currently are split on whether Title II of the ADA actually prohibits
employment discrimination. More discussion on the circuit split is taken up
under the third pathway discussed below. This part considers only whether
the two seminal cases under ADA Title II abrogation—Lane and Georgia—
could influence or mitigate some of the negative aspects of Garrett, and in
effect undermine the traditional view that Garrett sounded the end of Title I
damages and injunctive actions directly against the States.
A.

Lane and Georgia Generally

In Tennessee v. Lane, the Supreme Court was tasked with answering
whether Title II of the ADA validly abrogated state sovereign immunity.92
The facts at issue were simple and straightforward—courthouses in Tennessee did not comply with ADA standards for construction, which made entrance to the courthouses by persons with disabilities either far more difficult or totally impossible.93 The Court employed the traditional test to determine whether sovereign immunity had been abrogated. It started by noting that Congress had clearly expressed its intent to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity.94 Following the application of the City of Boerne test

92. 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
93. Id. at 513–14.
94. Id. at 517 (“To determine whether it has done so in any given case, we ‘must resolve
two predicate questions: first, whether Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate that immunity; and second, if it did, whether Congress acted pursuant to a valid grant of
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(which is separate from abrogation analysis because it does not require the
clear showing of intent to abrogate),95 the Court held that Title II was a valid
exercise of Congress’ powers to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment. First, Congress was seeking to enforce the Equal Protection
Clause, the Due Process Clause, and a number of other rights.96 Second,
Congress had identified a widespread history of government discrimination
even if it did not find a record of constitutionally invalid building designs.97
Finally, the ADA’s requirements were “congruent and proportional” to enforcing the Constitution given the nature of the rights involved (e.g., the
fundamental right of access to courts) and the widespread history of discrimination identified by Congress.98 In short, requiring accessible features was
not too far outside the bounds of constitutional requirements that all people
should be granted access to courts whenever feasible.99
There is one problem with Lane. In Lane, the Court very clearly stated
that it would go no further, at that time, than holding that Title II is valid
abrogation for actions to enforce the fundamental right of access to the
courts.100 Several courts considered Lane and held that Title II was invalid
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement legislation insofar as it sought to enforce rights that were not as fundamental as the right of access to the
courts.101
Two years later came the Court’s decision in United States v. Georgia.102 As I noted elsewhere, Georgia forced multiple circuits to reverse their
prior opinions or to withdraw them.103 In Georgia, an inmate at a Georgia
correctional facility sued the state under, inter alia, Title II of the ADA. He
alleged that his cell was inaccessible, and this led to numerous health issues
and possible constitutional violations.104 The State of Georgia, relying on
Lane and Garrett, argued that such damages actions are limited to fundamental rights such as those mentioned in Lane, and accessible cells are not
such a fundamental right.105

constitutional authority.’) (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000)); see
id. at 518 (“The first question is easily answered in this case.”).
95. Id. at 518–19.
96. Id. at 522–23.
97. Id. at 522–24.
98. Lane, 541 U.S. at 531.
99. Id. at 532.
100. Id. at 533–34.
101. Warden, supra note 22, at 75 n.188 (collecting sources).
102. 546 U.S. 151 (2006).
103. Warden, supra note 22, at 75 n.188 (collecting sources).
104. Georgia, 546 U.S. at 155.
105. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151
(2006) (No. 04-1203) (“First of all, this case is not anything like Tennessee versus Lane. It
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Fortunately, Georgia provided a vehicle to clear up the confusion left
by Garrett and Lane. The Court held that even non-fundamental rights may
properly abrogate sovereign immunity under Title II.106 In so doing, the
Court set forth the now oft-cited Georgia framework to determine whether a
law is valid enforcement legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment—
where the state actions actually violate both the ADA and the Constitution.
It further cited Lane as an example of valid enforcement where the state
action does not violate the Constitution. Combining the traditional clear
statement rule noted above with Georgia and Lane, the general framework
for analyzing whether proper abrogation has occurred is, on a claim-byclaim basis, asking:
(1) Whether Congress clearly expressed its intent to abrogate sovereign
immunity;107
a.

If the answer is yes, go on to step (2). For ADA purposes,
the answer to this question is always yes. It would be clear
error for a court to say otherwise; 108

(2) Whether the state action violated the ADA;109
a.

If not, there is no valid abrogation under the ADA. If it did
violate the ADA, one then goes to step (3);

(3) Whether the state action violated the ADA and the Constitution;110
a.

If so, there is proper abrogation. If not, one goes to step (4);

(4) If the law violated only the ADA but not the constitution, is it still
valid enforcement legislation?111 To answer this question, one asks:
a.

What right or rights was Congress trying to enforce? 112 For
ADA purposes, most courts focus on equal protection or
due process rights purportedly at issue in the case. 113 However, the ADA actually seeks to enforce virtually every
constitutional right, since the ADA clearly states Congress

doesn’t involve the very important civil right of access to courts, access to voting booths, or
anything like that.”).
106. Georgia, 546 U.S. at 158–59.
107. Warden, supra note 22, at 56.
108. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 517 (2004).
109. Warden, supra note 22, at 55.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 56 n.69.
113. Lane, 541 U.S. at 522.
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was seeking to use the full force of its Fourteenth Amendment power;114
b.

Did Congress identify a widespread pattern of constitutional violations?115 There is a split among the circuits as to the
full scope of this question, which will be answered in Part
III below;

c.

Are the relevant ADA requirements congruent and proportional to the enforcement of constitutional rights given the
nature of the rights at issue and the history of unconstitutional conduct identified?116 There is some gray area as to
the scope of this prong as well. That gray area is discussed
below in Part III as well.

Recall that in Garrett the Court held the facts alleged in the case did
not state a claim for a constitutional violation. Recall also that the Court
directly held that there was no documented, widespread history of discrimination in employment sufficient for abrogation. Finally, also recall that the
Court squarely held that, assuming the few examples of such discrimination
listed by Congress constituted such a history, Title I’s requirements were far
outside the bounds of what the Constitution requires of states when they
discriminate on the basis of disability, such that Title I amounted to an incongruent and disproportional remedy; and that due to its incongruence,
Title I was not enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment but rather an attempt at rewriting it. Therefore, the facts in Lane were concerned with Part
(4) of the Georgia-Lane analysis and not Parts (1) through (3). Thus, one
must ask what effect the Georgia-Lane analysis may have on Garrett.
B.

The Impact of Georgia

There are two questions to answer here. First, does Georgia extend
outside of Title II? Second, if so, can Georgia actually help cure some of the
worry created after Garrett? The answer to both is yes.
As to the first question, Georgia certainly must apply outside the confines of Title II of the ADA for several reasons. The first is that abrogation
under the ADA is not simply an ADA issue, it deals with a fundamental
constitutional question regarding federalism.117 It would be patently absurd
if the general analysis could change depending simply on the statute at issue.
Secondly, and more practically, the Georgia-Lane analysis is virtually the
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Warden, supra note 22, at 56 n.69.
Id.
Brown v. N.C. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 166 F.3d 698, 704 (4th Cir. 1999).
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same for Fourteenth Amendment enforcement legislation in general, which
was created under a non-ADA statute in City of Boerne.118 Furthermore,
Georgia itself cited numerous non-ADA abrogation cases to formulate the
now-famous framework.119 Thus, the case necessarily means that its own
framework applies outside the Title II context. As Georgia applies outside
the ADA Title II context to non-ADA cases, it applies to Title I of the ADA
especially.
As to the second question, the answer is yes because Georgia now
stands for the proposition that if a Title I plaintiff could meet requirements
of parts (1) through (3) of the Georgia-Lane analysis, that plaintiff could sue
the states for damages. Considering that a violation of the ADA would already meet the first two requirements of that analysis, one need only show
that there exist some situations in which government disability discrimination can amount to unconstitutional conduct. This is the second question
posed in the first paragraph of this subpart. Fortunately, there are two types
of claims that seem appropriate for discussion here. The first is animusbased rational basis scrutiny.120 The second is the substantive due process
right to pursue a profession claim.121
Animus-based rational basis scrutiny holds the following: “if the constitutional concept of equal protection of the laws means anything, it must at
the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate government interest.”122 The
same standard and test applies to disability discrimination regardless of
whether such discrimination is generally subject to only rational basis review.123 In short, then, where animus is detected and the animus is the only
cause of the conduct, the government conduct towards the person with a
disability becomes unconstitutional.124 Therefore, a hypothetical Title I
ADA plaintiff could show that discriminatory conduct perpetrated on them
118. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516–18 (1997). In City of Boerne, there
was no requirement of a clear expression; the court only considered its valid enforcement
against the City. A discussion of the distinction between abrogation and simple enforcement
under the Fourteenth Amendment can be found in Calvin Massey, Two Zones of Prophylaxis:
The Scope of the Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement Power, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 4
(2007).
119. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 158–59 (2006).
120. Carney v. Okla. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 875 F.3d 1347, 1353–54 (10th Cir. 2017)
(internal alterations and citations omitted).
121. Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 478 F. 3d 985, 998 (9th Cir. 2007).
122. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
123. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (“But mere
negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable in a
zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases for treating a home for the mentally retarded
differently from apartment houses, multiple dwellings, and the like.”).
124. Carney, 875 F.3d at 1354 (internal alterations and citations omitted).
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stemmed from mere animus (and indeed plaintiffs have every right to prove
this in court).125 Such a plaintiff could meet all of the first three requirements
of the Georgia-Lane framework.
Next, there is the substantive due process right of pursuing a profession. It has been held time and again, that economic rights are largely protected by a rational basis standard of scrutiny alone.126 Government conduct
crosses the constitutional line where it seeks to prohibit an individual from
pursing a profession entirely.127 While the parameters of this right and test
are presently unclear, it presents an excellent opportunity for an ADA Title I
plaintiff to assert actual constitutional violations in order to meet the first
three parts of the Georgia-Lane framework. A general set of hypothetical
facts that could present a prime situation to assert such a claim, is where a
government actor denies an individual an accommodation for their disability
and then proceeds to inform other employers around the locale that said person could not perform their job because of their disability.128
Therefore, Georgia’s impact on Garrett may be very far reaching.
Georgia allows ADA Title I plaintiffs who experience actual constitutional
violations to sue states for damages regardless of Garrett’s perceived foreclosure of that path.
IV. THE THIRD PATHWAY: TITLE II AS EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
This part considers the possibility and implications of using Title II of
the ADA, which deals with government services, programs, or activities, to
protect state employees with disabilities. This part will only consider the
utility of using Title II in situations where the government discrimination
does not violate the Constitution. Recall that if government conduct violates
both Title I and the Constitution, there is proper abrogation; as such there
would be no need to conduct the analysis set forth in this part. Thus, this
part considers only part (4) of the Georgia-Lane analysis set forth above. It
uses the following framework. Section A will discuss the circuit split as to
the viability of using Title II as employment law. Some courts allow it.
Some courts do not allow it. This section will briefly explain the reasonings
of the various court decisions and will conclude that those courts who allow
Title II employment claims are correct. Section B will then explain why the
part (4) analysis under Title II produces a different outcome than the part (4)
analysis that was putatively conducted in Garrett. Section B will have three
125. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 223 (5th Cir. 2013).
126. American Entertainers, L.L.C. v. City of Rocky Mount, 88 F.3d 707, 723 (4th Cir.
2018); Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir. 2004).
127. Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 478 F.3d 985, 998 (9th Cir. 2007).
128. To be sure, I do not believe that such facts are the only ones upon which such a
claim could lie.

572

UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

subsections. The first subsection will identify the rights that Congress
sought to enforce under Title II. The second subsection will discuss the history of discrimination prong of the Georgia-Lane analysis. This subsection
concludes that due to the sweeping aims of Title II, less specificity is required than was required under Title I in Garrett. Finally, the third subsection will discuss the congruence and proportionality prong. It concludes that
because of the sweeping nature of Title II’s findings and the Supreme
Court’s own precedent, less congruence and proportionality is required under Title II as employment law than was required under Title I as employment law. Title II, as this subsection will show, meets this requirement.
A.

The Circuit Split

Title II’s operative language states: “Subject to the provisions of this
subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”129
Some courts have examined this language and noted that the “or be
subject to discrimination” language is a catch all provision that prohibits
discriminatory conduct regardless of whether it constitutes a service program or activity.130 Other courts have looked at this language and concluded
that the entire provision refers only to services, programs, or activities.131
These latter courts view the catch all provision as merely prohibiting nontraditional forms of discrimination.132
By understanding why courts interpret the catch-all provision differently, it is possible to go deeper into the theoretical differences between the
courts that have borne the subject circuit split. Before examining the theoretical differences that underlie the split, it should be noted that the regulations
issued by the Attorney General to enforce Title II contain employment provisions.133 What follows is a list of reasonings given by the various courts on
the issue. While the reasons are listed all together, I note that some courts
only adopt one or a few of them. Those courts that take the narrower view of
Title II hold that the operative provision could not cover employment because (1) “services, programs, or activities” covers only outputs of public
entities and employment is an input, thus, employment cannot be covered

129.
130.
2012).
131.
132.
133.

42 U.S.C.A. § 12132 (Westlaw through Pub. L. 116-63).
See Seremeth v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs Frederick Cty., 673 F.3d 333, 338 (4th Cir.
See Zimmerman v. Or. Dep’t of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1176–77.
28 C.F.R. § 35.140 (2019).
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under Title II;134 (2) Title I covers employment such that it would be absurd
to say that Title II also covers employment;135 and (3) because Title II cannot be said to cover employment, the regulations concerning employment
are directly contrary to the statute and are unlawful.136 Some courts, however, have suggested that Title II covers employment discrimination where
Title I does not apply—such as where the government entity does not employ enough people.137
What follows now is a listing of reasons why courts find that Title II
does cover employment practices. Those courts that take the broader view
hold that Title II certainly covers employment discrimination because (1)
Title II covers more than merely government services, but everything a public entity does, such that it covers non-outputs like employment;138 (2) even
though Title I covers employment by public entities, this does not foreclose
the possibility that Title II also covers employment in the same cases because litigants often have multiple avenues for relief under the law;139 and
(3) because Title II might cover employment discrimination, its language is
at least ambiguous as to employment discrimination and because its language is ambiguous, the regulations issued to enforce it are given controlling weight.140 Indeed that the circuits can disagree as to the meaning of the
words, necessarily means that they are ambiguous.141
With all due respect for the courts that take the narrower view of Title
II, the more expansive view is correct. Title II of the ADA and the ADA as a
whole constitute remedial legislation.142 As remedial legislation, its provisions should be interpreted broadly.143 This broad interpretation mandate is
referenced not only in the regulations regarding Title II as a whole,144 but in
numerous opinions and scholarship that note the ADA has a much more
comprehensive view of discrimination than even the sweeping anti-

134. Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1174.
135. See id. at 1176–79.
136. Id. at 1179.
137. Mary Jo C. v. N.Y. State & Local Ret. Sys., 707 F.3d 144, 171 (2d Cir. 2013).
138. Bledsoe v. Palm Beach Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 133 F.3d 816, 820–23
(11th Cir. 1998).
139. Currie v. Group. Ins. Comm’n., 290 F.3d 1, 6–7 (1st Cir. 2002) (specifically discussing the ADA).
140. Skinner v. Salem Sch. Dist., 718 F. Supp. 2d 186, 192 (D.N.H. 2010).
141. This is a mere matter of logic. No one doubts that the individuals who sit on the
federal circuit courts are extremely intelligent. To say that Title II is not at least ambiguous at
this point would be tantamount to saying that those who sit on the pro-Title II employment
circuit courts are lacking in their capacities to reason.
142. Darian v. Univ. of Mass. Bos., 980 F. Supp. 77, 87 (D. Mass. 1997).
143. Johnson v. Runyon, 47 F.3d 911, 917 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting remedial legislation
should be interpreted broadly to effectuate its purpose).
144. 28 C.F.R. § 35.101 (2019).
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discrimination laws of the past.145 Indeed, Congress asserted the need for a
broad understanding of the ADA in such a way as to embarrass the courts.
The Supreme Court was once faced with adopting either a narrow or broad
interpretation of the ADA and it adopted a narrower interpretation even
though a broad interpretation was possible. Congress responded by specifically abrogating those decisions and listing them in the relevant legislation.146 Further still, a broad interpretation of the ADA that Title II covers
employment discrimination would comport with modern understanding of
Title II because it covers “everything a public entity does.”147 Lastly, courts
that adopt a narrow version of Title II and find it does not cover the same
situations that Title I covers ignore two very important facts: (1) as noted
above, litigants often have multiple avenues for relief even under the same
act;148 and (2) there is a difference between using the Title for employment
cases—whereas Title I does not amount to valid abrogation under part (4) of
the Georgia-Lane framework, Title II does.
The reasons why Title I is not a valid abrogation of sovereign immunity whereas Title II does validly abrogate sovereign immunity are discussed
below.
B.

Title II as Valid Abrogation in the Employment Context Where Conduct Does Not Also Violate the Constitution
1.

Right or Rights at Issue

The first step in the part (4) analysis is asking what right or rights Congress was seeking to enforce when it enacted the relevant legislation.149 The
Americans with Disabilities Act contains a very clear statement that it
145. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 598 (1999) (“We are satisfied that
Congress had a more comprehensive view of the concept of discrimination advanced in the
ADA.”).
146. See Warden, supra note 1, at 36.
147. Yeskey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 118 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that similar
“broad language” in the ADA’s implementing regulations was “intended to appl[y] to anything a public entity does”) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d,
524 U.S. 206 (1998); Barden v. City of Sacramento, 292 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 2002).
148. Currie v. Group. Ins. Comm’n., 290 F.3d 1, 6–7 (1st Cir. 2002) (specifically discussing the ADA).
149. Bearden v. Oklahoma ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 234 F. Supp. 3d
1148, 1151 (W.D. Okla. 2017) (“To determine the validity of Congress’ action the court must
consider: “(1) the nature of the constitutional right at issue; (2) the extent to which Congress’s remedial statute was passed in response to a documented history of relevant constitutional violations; and (3) whether the congressional statute is “congruent and proportional” to
the specific class of violations at issue, given the nature of the relevant constitutional right
and the identified history of violations.”) (quoting Guttman v. Khalsa, 669 F.3d 1101, 1117
(10th Cir. 2012)).
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sought to assert the full force of the Fourteenth Amendment.150 As such, the
ADA was intended to enforce equal protection,151 due process,152 the Privileges or Immunities Clause,153 all unwritten rights held against the states by
the substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause,154 and all rights incorporated against the states by virtue of the same
substantive due process.155 Most relevant to the discussion here is the Equal
Protection Clause.
To be sure, the Equal Protection Clause protects people from discriminatory conduct.156 However, it is not unconstitutional to discriminate on the
basis of disability where the government does so in a way that is rationally
related to a legitimate government interest.157 That being said, of course, that
statement assumes that discrimination against persons with disabilities or
denial of employment is constitutional. I assume this for the sake of argument for the purpose of the requirement that one identify what right or rights
are at issue. The question is whether the ADA in this instance goes too far
beyond that constitutional rule? This question will be answered by the next
two subsections.
2.

A History of Unconstitutional Conduct

The test to determine whether there is or has been a history of unconstitutional conduct is whether Congress sufficiently identified a widespread
pattern of unconstitutional conduct.158 If so, the question then becomes how
specific must this widespread pattern of unconstitutional conduct be? For
example, in Garrett, the Court required Congress to have identified a widespread history of unconstitutional disability-based employment discrimination.159 In other words, did Congress identify a history of irrational treatment
of people with disabilities in employment?160 The Court held that Congress
150. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(b)(4) (Westlaw through Pub. L. 116-65).
151. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522 (2004).
152. Id. at 522–23.
153. Id. (because it is in the Fourteenth Amendment).
154. Id.
155. Derek Warden, The Ninth Cause: Using the Ninth Amendment as a Cause of Action
to Cure Incongruence in Current Civil Rights Litigation Law, 64 WAYNE L. REV. 403, 411
n.50 (2018) (listing the cases that slowly incorporated the Bill of Rights against the states).
156. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam) (quoting
Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota Cty., 260 U.S. 441, 445 (1923)).
157. Michael E. Waterstone, Disability Constitutional Law, 63 EMORY L. REV. 527, 529
(2014) (noting that disability discrimination is subject only to rational basis review).
158. Guttman v. Khalsa, 669 F.3d 1101, 1117 (10th Cir. 2012).
159. Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 369, 370–72 (2001) (noting that
Congress failed to show findings of unconstitutional state discrimination in employment)
160. Id. at 368, 371.
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had not so identified a history.161 According to the majority, it was not
enough that Congress had identified a widespread history of unconstitutional
conduct toward people with disabilities by public entities as a whole.162 This
need for particularized historical violations was fully visible in the majority
rejecting the dissent’s argument that Congress had identified numerous unconstitutional acts of public entities.163
This type of historical record of particularized constitutional violations
was not required in Lane, however.164 Recall that in Lane, the plaintiffs sued
about the physical accessibility of courthouses.165 If the historical record
prong of the analysis were the same for both Title I and Title II, then Lane
would have required the plaintiff show a widespread historical record of
unconstitutional building practices. This was not required.166 In fact, Lane
found that the historical record prong was met for courthouse accessibility
purposes because of widespread violations of other constitutional rights and
discriminatory conduct.167
Why is there this distinction between Garrett and Lane? The only plausible reason is that the historical record prong is elastic and its requirements
depend on the aim of the relevant statutory provision.168 Thus, Title I requires a record of unconstitutional employment actions because it focuses
solely on employment.169 Title II does not need a particularized showing
because its focus is on government conduct generally, of which only some
actions involve basic civil rights; thus, a plaintiff need only show a history
of unconstitutional government action in general.170
While some courts still look for a particularized record for a particular
right, even those that require such a record find that Title II is a valid abro161. Id. at 371.
162. Id. at 371 n.7 (noting that widespread unconstitutional conduct as whole would be
applicable under Title II and not Title I, which, per the above discussion, needed specific
examples of unconstitutional employment practices).
163. Id. at 371 (rejecting Justice Breyer’s dissenting argument that he “would infer from
Congress’ general conclusions regarding societal discrimination against the disabled that the
States had likewise participated in such action”).
164. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
165. Id. at 513–14.
166. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
167. Id. at 522–23.
168. Other courts have begun to recognize this in part. However, they do so on the
grounds that Lane considered the record of Title II as a whole. Thus, so long as persons can
prove a violation of Title II, they meet the historical record prong. See Ass’n for Disabled
Am. v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 405 F.3d 954, 958 (11th Cir. 2005).
169. At least one court has expressly stated this. See Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of
George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 485 n.6 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting that due, in part, to Title
II’s aim of enforcing various rights, “less evidence was required to establish a pattern of
unconstitutional conduct.”).
170. See Ass’n for Disabled Am., 405 F.3d at 958; Constantine, 411 F.3d at 485 n.6.
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gation of sovereign immunity, even in the rational basis context.171 However, the majority of courts have noted the distinction between Lane and Garrett and have now concluded that Lane has foreclosed the requirement of a
particularized record of unconstitutional conduct under Title II.172 In other
words, the only real question left in the Georgia-Lane analysis is whether
the requirements of Title II of the ADA, in the particular instance, are “congruent and proportional.”173
The majority of courts are correct. Title II necessarily meets the historical record prong of the Georgia-Lane analysis. A plaintiff need only show
that Congress has identified a widespread history of unconstitutional conduct by state and local governments generally, regardless of the particular
right involved in the case. To hold otherwise would be to ignore the Supreme Court’s clear directive,174 and would be to ignore the fact that Lane
itself did not require such a particularized historical record. Because the
Court has already concluded Title II meets this prong entirely, were a Title
II employment plaintiff able to show a violation of the statute, he or she
would also meet both (4)(a) and (4)(b) of the Georgia-Lane framework.
Thus, to reiterate what was said above, the only question left is the congruence and proportionality question.
3.

Congruence and Proportionality

This prong asks whether the statutory regime is congruent and proportional to the relevant constitutional rights given the nature of the rights at
issue and the history of unconstitutional conduct identified.175 The doctrinal
question itself admits that different standards apply to more sweeping laws,
requiring broader historical findings, than to more specific laws, which need
narrower findings. As such, one would be justified in believing that less
congruence and proportionality is required for Title II (as the depth of his171. Toledo v. Sanchez, 454 F.3d 24, 35 (1st Cir. 2006).
172. Constantine, 411 F.3d at 487; Cochran v. Pinchak, 401 F.3d 184, 191 (3d Cir. 2005),
vacated, 412 F.3d 500 (3d Cir. 2005); Ass’n for Disabled Am., 405 F.3d at 958.
173. As will be shown below, Title II in this instance meets this test because less congruence and proportionality is required where, as here, the statute is supported by a very clear
historical record.
174. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 529 (2004) (“The conclusion that Congress drew
from this body of evidence is set forth in the text of the ADA itself: ‘[D]iscrimination against
individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as ... education, transportation,
communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public
services.’ This finding, together with the extensive record of disability discrimination that
underlies it, makes clear beyond peradventure that inadequate provision of public services
and access to public facilities was an appropriate subject for prophylactic legislation.” (citing
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (2019))).
175. Guttman v. Khalsa, 669 F.3d 1101, 1117 (10th Cir. 2012).
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torical unconstitutional conduct is very sweeping) than was required for
Title I (which is limited to employment and had almost no valid historical
record).
The difference in standards is in full view when one examines the relationship between Garrett and Lane.176 In Garrett, the Court focused its congruence and proportionality analysis on the constitutional requirements for
employees with disabilities to be free from employment discrimination.177 In
Lane, however, the Court did not solely focus on the constitutional rule for
physically accessible courthouses.178 Indeed, it could not have because there
is no constitutional rule that courthouses must comply with the ADA’s requirements.179 Instead, Lane focused on consonance with other constitutional rules: freedom of the press,180 due process,181 as well as the duty to provide counsel to certain defendants.182 For the Lane Court, requiring courthouses to be accessible to persons with disabilities under the ADA looked
closer to the requirement that all people have the ability to have their day in
court,183 even if accessible features are not necessarily required by the Constitution.184 To be sure, Lane is no longer controversial; a unanimous Court
in United States v. Georgia cited it as binding.185
a.

Consonance based congruence and proportionality

This subsection argues that plaintiffs should be able to satisfy the congruence and proportionality requirements by identifying other constitutional
protections and showing that the ADA’s requirements are similar to or consonant with those requirements, even if those other cases do not necessarily
concern constitutional issues relating specifically to those with disabilities.
176. Constantine, 411 F.3d at 488 n.10 (“[T]he congruence and proportionality of Title II
must be measured against a record of unconstitutional discrimination that is ‘clear beyond
peradventure,’ while Title I was considered in light of a record that had to be ‘squeezed
out.’”).
177. Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372 (2001).
178. Lane, 541 U.S. 509.
179. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 157–58 (noting that in Lane there were no
constitutional violations).
180. Lane, 546 U.S. at 523 (noting that the ADA was seeking to enforce First Amendment rights).
181. Id. at 533 (“[T]his duty to accommodate is perfectly consistent with the wellestablished due process principle that, ‘within the limits of practicability, a State must afford
to all individuals a meaningful opportunity to be heard’ in its courts.” (quoting Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971))).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 532–33.
184. Id. at 543 n.4 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“Certainly, respondents Lane and Jones
were not denied these constitutional rights.”)
185. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 157 (2006).
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To be sure, the Supreme Court has never expressly adopted this consonancebased theory. However, several lower courts have adopted this approach.
For example, in cases related to education, lower courts have held that while
failing to accommodate people with disabilities in public education may not
violate the Constitution, the ADA accommodation provisions applicable to
public education and its general prohibition on disability discrimination are
“consonant” with or look like other recognized constitutional rights.186 Another recognized constitutional right was established in Plyler v. Doe, where
the Court held that a state’s denial of public education to children of undocumented aliens would fail rational basis scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause because it would deny them numerous other societal rights.187 Likewise, failing to accommodate children with disabilities in public education
would also deny those children numerous other rights and opportunities to
participate in society.188 Thus, these cases show that where a Title II plaintiff
can show consonance between the requirements of the ADA and some other
constitutional protection, that plaintiff has met the less exacting congruence
and proportionality requirement under Title II ADA cases.
In other words, the mandate that remedies for discriminatory conduct
be congruent and proportional to the wrong, considering the nature of the
right or rights at issue and the history of unconstitutional conduct as identified by Congress, shows that in some cases less congruence and proportionality is required than in other cases. Otherwise, there would be no need to
take into account the nature of the right and the historical record. This is
especially true for Title II of the ADA, which has a greater documented past
of wrongful discrimination and requires less congruence and proportionality
than does Title I. Less specificity is required for both the historical prong of
the analysis (because of Title II’s sweeping nature) and less tailoring is required for the congruence and proportionality analysis (because of the
sweeping nature of the statute and the large historical record). Indeed, the
proper focus of the congruence and proportionality analysis under Title II
should not be tailored to any one specific constitutional rule applicable to
disabilities alone; but whether the requirements of the ADA are consonant
with some other constitutional protection, or whether they go too far beyond
any case or doctrine ever announced by the Court. Thus, to summarize the
186. Toledo v. Sanchez, 454 F.3d 24, 40 (1st Cir. 2006) (“Title II’s provisions are consonant with the recognition in Plyler v. Doe that, without an education, individuals are deprived
of ‘the ability to live within the structure of our civil institutions’ and therefore foreclosed
from ‘any realistic possibility that they will contribute in even the smallest way to the progress of our Nation.’”); see also Ass’n for Disabled Am. v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 405 F.3d 954,
957–58 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that the ADA’s was seeking to enforce rights similar to those
found in Plyler v. Doe).
187. Toledo, 454 F.3d at 40 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982)).
188. Id. at 40.
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consonance theory of congruence and proportionality: due to the broad purposes of Title II and the broad history of constitutional rights violations
identified by Congress, and insofar as it relates to Title II, the congruence
and proportionality requirement is met so long as there is some consonance
between (1) the ADA and (2) some other constitutional law case.189
A consonance-based congruence and proportionality test is firmly supported by the general purpose of abrogation theory. The purpose, as noted in
several cases, is to ensure that Congress was attempting to enforce a constitutional right and not trying to rewrite the Court’s jurisprudence.190 Thus,
litigants seeking to rely on a consonance theory can point to established
rights to show that yes, Congress was aware of the Court’s pronouncements
and was enforcing the right or rights identified therein.
Fortunately, for Title II employment plaintiffs, there is such a case—
Turner v. Fouche.191 There, the plaintiffs wanted to be considered for positions on a school board. The State of Georgia prohibited any person who did
not own property in freehold from sitting on school boards.192 Holding that
the law was subject to rational basis scrutiny alone, the Court went on to
strike down the law, stating:
We may assume that the appellants have no right to be appointed to the
Taliaferro County board of education. But the appellants and the members of their class do have a federal constitutional right to be considered
for public service without the burden of invidiously discriminatory disqualifications. The State may not deny to some the privilege of holding
public office that it extends to others on the basis of distinctions that violate federal constitutional guarantees.
....
However reasonable the assumption that those who own realty do possess such an attachment, Georgia may not rationally presume that that
quality is necessarily wanting in all citizens of the county whose estates
are less than freehold.193

Thus, the Court admitted that even though it was theoretically possible
that the property qualification could amount to a legitimate government interest, it was irrational for that interest to be imputed to every person who
did not own property. Therefore, the Court, in effect, held that owning prop189. See Derek Warden, Ex Tenebris Lux: Buck v. Bell and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 51 U. TOL. L. REV. 57, 89 n.338 (2019).
190. Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001); Lane, 541 U.S. at
521, 541 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
191. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970).
192. Id. at 364.
193. Id. at 362–64.
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erty bears no relation to the ability of the plaintiffs to effectively perform the
duties required of the board; and admitted that while there may be some
plausible reason why owning property may affect job performance, the state
is still prohibited from denying non-property owners positions because (1)
not all non-property owners would be unable to fulfill their duties and this
inability could not be imputed to all non-property owners;194 and (2) those
who meet the otherwise minimum qualifications are still able to meet the
fundamental requirements of the job.195
Therefore, a clear cognate exists between Turner and the ADA: having
a disability largely has no effect on one’s ability to do his or her job; 196 and
even assuming that some situations exist where there may be reasons for
denying such persons jobs (e.g., saving money on accommodation) the
ADA’s requirements still prohibit discrimination and require accommodation because (1) not every person with a disability will require accommodation, nor be unable to perform their duties such as to impute any inabilities
to all persons with disabilities,197 and (2) the ADA only requires reasonable
accommodation in so far as the person is otherwise qualified with or without
the accommodation.198 Therefore, under the consonance theory, a Title II
employment plaintiff meets congruence and proportionality because the
ADA’s requirements are consonant with and go little further than the underlying constitutional theory of Turner.
b.

Garrett’s narrow approach to congruence and proportionality

Further still, even assuming we take the Garrett approach to congruence and proportionality instead of “consonants or cognate,” and assuming
that a plaintiff needs congruence and proportionality with a constitutional
rule for employment discrimination on the basis of disability—we still meet
part (4) of the Georgia-Lane framework.199 Here that is so because of the
vast historical record present and applicable to Title II that did not exist under Title I, which necessitates a more generous view of congruence and proportionality.200 Title II prohibits irrational discrimination, as does the Consti-

194. Id. at 364 (noting the states may not “presume that that quality is necessarily wanting
in all citizens of the county whose estates are less than freehold”).
195. Id. at 363–64 (“It cannot be seriously urged that a citizen in all other respects qualified to sit on a school board must also own real property if he is to participate responsibly in
educational decisions.”).
196. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. 116-63).
197. For example, a person who has a mobility impairment will not have the same limitations as a person with visual impairments.
198. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12131(2) (Westlaw through Pub. L. 116-63).
199. See supra Part IV.A.
200. See supra Part IV.B.1.b.
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tution;201 it also prohibits violations of the substantive due process right to
pursue a profession described previously.202 However, it also places requirements on the state employers that are beyond constitutional requirements. Nevertheless, another lesson from Georgia and Lane is that there
need not be perfect parity between Title II and the Constitution, so long as
the requirements are an appropriate means of protecting those constitutional
rights. The ADA, providing more protections than the Constitution, is appropriate for a number of reasons. First, the ADA merely requires that accommodation be reasonable.203 Second, the ADA may allow the states to
deny unreasonable requests that require far more than the Constitution.204
Third, accommodation requirements and the prohibition on discrimination
are a means of prohibiting employers from masking outright animus-based
discrimination with the veil of “saving money.”205 Fourth, likewise, the
ADA’s requirements help insure that people with disabilities are able to
pursue their professions unencumbered by irrational conduct before the state
actors commit acts that would amount to such irrationality.206
As such, under either the consonance-based approach to congruence
and proportionality or the more narrow approach as was required in Garrett,
Title II as employment legislation meets part (4) of the Georgia-Lane analysis described above. To be sure, some courts have noted that Title II, as employment discrimination, does not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity. However, these erroneous rulings were the result of the courts’ failures to
recognize that (1) Title II of the ADA necessitates a broader view of the
historical record and (2) the historical record produced applicable to Title II
necessitates far less congruence and proportionality than required for Title
I.207
201. See generally Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522 (2004) (“Title II . . . seeks to
enforce this prohibition on irrational disability discrimination”); Toledo v. Sanchez, 454 F.3d
24 (1st Cir. 2006) (recognizing that while the Equal Protection Clause prohibits irrational
discrimination, the ADA does as well but also prohibits other conduct).
202. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(3) (Westlaw through Pub. L. 116-63) (noting that people with disabilities had often faced discrimination in employment); see also Marina v. City
Univ. of N.Y., 18 F. Supp. 3d 320, 330, 339 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (recognizing ADA can enforce
substantive due process as well).
203. Lane, 541 U.S. at 531.
204. The Court, in Lane, acknowledged this allowance. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 531–32.
205. Justice Rehnquist in Garrett virtually admitted that some employment actions may
well be animus based. See Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367–68 (2001)
(“They could quite hardheadedly—and perhaps hardheartedly—hold to job-qualification
requirements which do not make allowance for the disabled.”).
206. See, 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i) (2019) (requiring public entities to make reasonable
modifications to avoid discrimination).
207. See Clifton v. Ga. Merit Sys., 478 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1368 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (“The
court finds that the Supreme Court’s holding in Garrett that ‘[t]he legislative record of the
ADA . . . simply fails to show that Congress did in fact identify a pattern of irrational state
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V. THE FOURTH PATHWAY: DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION MADE
ILLEGITIMATE FOR EQUAL PROTECTION PURPOSES BY THE ADA AS
COMMERCE CLAUSE LEGISLATION
Recall that in Garrett the Court held that Title I of the ADA was not a
valid abrogation of sovereign immunity because it failed part (4) of the
Georgia-Lane analytical framework described above. In other words, Congress failed to adequately identify a widespread history of unconstitutional
employment discrimination against persons with disabilities, and that even
assuming there was a history of such discrimination, that identified history
was not widespread enough to warrant finding that Title I’s requirements
were congruent and proportional. Nevertheless, as noted above, the outcome
of Garrett would change where Title II is used to attack employment discrimination because (1) due to the sweeping nature of Title II, it requires
less specificity in its historical findings; and (2) due to the deep historical
findings and sweep of Title II, less congruence and proportionality is required for it to validly abrogate sovereign immunity. Moreover, as shown
above, because of Georgia and Lane, where government conduct violates
both Title I of the ADA and the Constitution the statute has validly abrogated state sovereign immunity. This part briefly considers another implication
from only that last statement of law. A full law review article setting forth
this argument as applicable to all other pieces of federal legislation is left for
a later time.
The Court in Garrett held that classifications based on disability are
subject only to rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause.208 A
law or government action will fail the rational basis test if it is not rationally
related to a legitimate government interest.209 In Garrett, the Court noted
that, under the facts of the case, denying accommodations satisfied rational
basis because such was a rational means of achieving the legitimate government interest of saving money.210
Assuming that cutting cost is a legitimate government interest, and that
denying accommodations to persons with disabilities is a rational means of
achieving that end, one must ask whether there are situations in which saving money would not be a legitimate government interest? To answer this
question, we must understand that “legitimate interest” is largely an amor-

discrimination in employment against the disabled’ is equally applicable to employment
discrimination claims under Title I and Title II of the ADA.” (quoting Garrett, 531 U.S. at
368)).
208. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366–67.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 372.
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phous term;211 and courts tend to disagree as to what amounts to a legitimate
government interest.212 Nevertheless, some general propositions help to answer the question. One possible way to determine whether a government
interest is legitimate is by identifying interests that are disapproved of by the
whole of American society or its traditions.213 As such, it stands to reason
that if any government interest manifested in such a way that ran afoul of
widespread and well-accepted public policies and traditions, it is illegitimate. Put another way, if a governmental interest manifests in such a way
that the manifestation violates clear and well-established societal norms,
such conduct could not be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.
Discriminating against people with disabilities either by disparate
treatment or by failing to accommodate such persons violates widespread
societal norms that have existed for decades. Almost every state in the union
prohibits disability discrimination either in their own constitutions or in
statutes.214 Shockingly enough, the Supreme Court in Garrett admitted that
anti-disability discrimination laws were widespread and enacted in every
state of the union.215 Moreover, the ADA itself was passed by both chambers
of Congress with sweeping majorities.216 The view that Congress, through
its legislative authority, can issue public policies that set the standard for
legitimate government interests goes hand in hand with the Supreme Court’s
own stated rule that “Congress is the final authority as to desirable public
policy, but in order to authorize individuals to recover money damages
against the state, [the law must be constitutional].”217 To say that the Courts
can determine public policy for what constitutes a legitimate government

211. Timothy Sandefur, Is Economic Exclusion A Legitimate State Interest? Four Recent
Cases Test the Boundaries, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1023, 1036 (2006).
212. Id.
213. Other scholars have noted that the Court will at times overrule a prior decision’s
assertion of what constitutes a legitimate government interest based on larger widespread
social movements. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Judicial Supremacy, Judicial Activism: Cooper
v. Aaron and Parents Involved, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1191, 1201 (2008) (“When it overruled
Bowers v. Hardwick in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court was undoubtedly reacting to the greater
social acceptance of homosexuality, reflected in both the general social climate and concrete
data such as state court decisions striking down sodomy bans on state constitutional
grounds.”). In other words, just as history in the due process context can tell us what amounts
to a protected right, so too can history tell us what amounts to a legitimate government interest.
214. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368 n.5.
215. Id.
216. Mary Jo C. v. N.Y. State & Local Ret. Sys., 707 F.3d 144, 152 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 516 (2004)).
217. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374.
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interest but Congress cannot, directly contradicts this principle, and faces
similar criticism as other now defunct doctrines.218
Of course, claiming that with the ADA Congress was establishing desirable public policy would only be valid if the ADA were itself constitutional. The ADA, in so far as it relates to employment situations may not be
universally understood to be valid Fourteenth Amendment legislation. However, no one doubts that it is valid Commerce Clause legislation. Indeed, the
Supreme Court in Garrett itself admitted this when it said that Title I could
be enforced against the States via Ex parte Young.219 As such, Title I is valid
Commerce Clause legislation, and thus, is a valid expression of national
policy prohibiting discrimination against persons with disabilities whether
that manifests in unequal treatment or from failure to reasonably accommodate.
Therefore, Title I is a valid and long-standing national policy prohibiting various forms of employment discrimination against people with disabilities. Any government interest contrary to the policy of the ADA is, therefore, an illegitimate government interest. As such, those governmental actions should fail rational basis scrutiny because the actions are necessarily
not rationally related to legitimate government interests. It follows that every violation of Title I committed by a governmental entity is a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause.
Establishing that every violation of Title I is a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause would totally undermine Garrett. Garrett, recall, was decided on parts (4)(b) and (c) of the what I have called the Georgia-Lane
framework. However, as shown in Part II, that framework holds that where
conduct violates both the ADA and the Constitution, abrogation of sovereign immunity is valid. Because, as shown in this part, a violation of Title I
is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, every state-employee Title I
plaintiff validly asserts that the ADA has abrogated state sovereign immunity. Thus, plaintiffs may obtain damages or injunctive relief against the states
directly, bypassing the Eleventh Amendment.
VI. CONCLUSION
While I fully believe that Garrett ranks among the Supreme Court’s
worst decisions and may belong in the disability rights anti-canon, I also
admit that it is error to believe that Garrett ended Title I’s applicability to
state employees. This article has shown four pathways to undermine and
218. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72 (1938) (criticizing doctrine of Swift v.
Tyson on the grounds that the courts had assumed a power in a broad field in which “Congress was confessedly without power to enact . . . statutes”).
219. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9.
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assuage concerns stemming from Garrett. It is my hope that Garrett will
soon be a thing of the past, much like all the other invidious social ills that
persons with disabilities have faced throughout history.

